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Articles 
Special Section – EU Citizenship, Federalism and Rights 




EU Citizenship: Some Systemic Constitutional Implications 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: I. Citizenships in Europe: harmony and conflict. – I.1. A curious legal status perched on 
limitations. – I.2. EU citizenship: two lessons. – II. EU citizenship: questioning the established narrative. – 
II.1. Empowering the citizen – Humiliating the State. – II.2. Promoting democracy – Undermining demo-
cratic outcomes. – II.3. Promoting non-discrimination – Undermining equality. – II.4. Implications for the 
rule of law: the sole possibility of one type of constitutionalism. – III. We have time: the new picture is 
here to stay. 
 
I. The EU boasts layered citizenships1 – the nationalities of the Member States are 
supplemented by an “additional”,2 “independent”3 EU-level citizenship granted to Mem-
ber State nationals and impossible without the nationalities of the Member States.4 Ac-
cording to the Court of Justice, it is “destined to be the fundamental status of nationals 
of the Member States”.5 This prophesy from the shapers of the law is slowly being ful-
filled, unsurprisingly, as the status has received a significant boost over recent dec-
ades,6 some disagreements in the literature about its occasional retreat notwithstand-
 
1 C. SCHÖNBERGER, Unionsbürger: Europas föderales Bürgerrecht in vergleichender Sicht, Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2005. 
2 Art. 20 TFEU. 
3 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro delivered on 30 September 2009, case C-135/08, Rottmann, para. 23. 
4 C. SCHÖNBERGER, European Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: Some Citizenship Lessons of Compar-
ative Federalism, in European Review of Public Law, 2007, p. 63 et seq.; M. SZPUNAR, M.E. BLAS LÓPEZ, Some 
Reflections on Member States Nationality: A Prerequisite of EU Citizenship and an Obstacle to Its Enjoy-
ment, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2017; H.U. JESSURUN D’OLIVEIRA, Union Citizenship and Beyond, in EUI Working Papers LAW, 
no. 15, 2018. 
5 E.g. Court of Justice: judgment of 20 September 2001, case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, para. 31; judgment 
of 17 September 2002, case C-413/99, Baumbast and R, para. 82; judgment of 8 March 2011, case C-
34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, para. 41; judgment of 2 June 2016, case C-438/14, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, 
para. 29; judgment of 5 June 2018, case C-673/16, Coman and Others, para. 30. 
6 D. KOSTAKOPOULOU, Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change, in 
Modern Law Review, 2005, p. 233 et seq.; G. PALOMBELLA, Whose Europe? After the Constitution: A Goal-
Based Citizenship, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2005, p. 377 et seq.; D. KOCHENOV, A Real 
European Citizenship; A New Jurisdiction Test; A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Eu-
rope, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 2011, p. 55 et seq. 
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ing.7 Ulli Jessurun d’Oliveira’s age of the “pies in the sky”, if it was ever correctly diag-
nosed at all,8 is now definitely over, even if the question is open as to what precisely to 
count as the starting point of its demise. Candidates for the starting moment of EU citi-
zenship abound. The point of citizenship’s proverbial “birth” could overlap with Ruiz 
Zambrano,9 Rottmann,10 Grzelczyk,11 Martínez Sala,12 the Treaty of Maastricht,13 Mich-
eletti,14 or could have even taken place earlier than that.15 Important rights effective 
throughout all EU territory accrue to this supranational citizenship, which stems directly 
from EU law, thus fulfilling the historic prophecy of Van Gend en Loos concerning the 
“constitutional heritage” of every European.16 However, this picture is nuanced by the 
fact that EU citizenship is sometimes, quite surprisingly, characterised as “not intended 
 
7 O. GARNER, The Existential Crisis of Citizenship of the European Union: The Argument for an Auton-
omous Status, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 2018, p. 116 et seq.; N. NIC SHUIBHNE, 
Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are the Implications for the Citizen When the Polity 
Bargain Is Privileged?, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit. 
8 H.U. JESSURUN D’OLIVEIRA, Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?, in A. ROSAS, E. ANTOLA (eds), A Citizens’ Eu-
rope. In Search of a New Order, London: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 58. 
9 Ruiz Zambrano, cit.; D. KOCHENOV, A Real European Citizenship, cit.; S. PLATON, Le champ 
d’application des droits du citoyen européen après les arrêts Zambrano, McCarthy et Dereci: de la boîte 
de Pandore au labyrinth du Minotaure, in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 2012, p. 21 et seq.; M. 
VAN DEN BRINK, EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights: Taking EU Citizenship Rights Seriously?, in Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration, 2012, p. 273 et seq.; M. HAILBRONNER, S. IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ, The European 
Court of Justice and Citizenship of the European Union: New Developments Towards a Truly Fundamental 
Status, in Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law, 2011, p. 498 et seq. 
10 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C-135/08, Rottmann; G. DAVIES, The Entirely Conven-
tional Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights, in J. SHAW (ed.), Has the European Court of Justice Chal-
lenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law?, in EUI Working Papers RSCAS, no. 62, 2011; D. 
KOCHENOV, Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 
March 2010, in Common Market Law Review, 2010, p. 1831 et seq.; G.-R. DE GROOT, Overwegingen over de 
Janko Rottmann-beslissing van het Europese Hof van Justitie, in Asiel- en Migrantenrecht, 2010, p. 293 et 
seq.; H.U. JESSURUN D’OLIVEIRA, Ontkoppeling van nationaliteit en Unieburgerschap?, in Nederlands Juris-
tenblad, 2010, p. 785 et seq.; S. IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ, ¿Hacia una nueva relación entre la nacionalidad estatal y la 
cuidadanía europea? TJUE Sentencia de 2 de marzo de 2010 (gran sala), Janko Rottmann C. Freistaat Bayern, 
Asunto C-135/08, in Revista de derecho comunitario europeo, 2010, p. 933 et seq. 
11 Grzelczyk, cit. 
12 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern. See also 
Opinion of AG La Pergola delivered on 1 July 1997, case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, para. 18. 
13 C. CLOSA, Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States, in Common Market Law Re-
view, 1995, p. 487 et seq. Cf. S. O’LEARY, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free 
Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship, The Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996. 
14 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C-369/90, Micheletti and Others v. Delegación del 
Gobierno en Cantabria, para.10. 
15 W. MAAS, Creating European Citizens, Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007; F.G. JACOBS (ed.), Eu-
ropean Law and the Individual, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976. 
16 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 February 1963, case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos. O. DUE, The Law-
Making Role of the European Court of Justice Considered in Particular from the Perspective of Individuals 
and Undertakings, in Nordic Journal of International Law, 1994, p. 123 et seq. 
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to enlarge the scope ratione materiae [of EU law]”17 – a dictum of the Court which is 
most likely ultra vires,18 and certainly significantly out of tune with the case law in other 
areas. Having been dissected and criticised by the author with Sir Richard Plender else-
where,19 it is most likely bad law by now. 
I.1. Crucially, EU citizenship is one of those rare legal statuses which, although entirely 
dependent on the determination of the boundary of the material scope of the law 
which created it20 – being a derivative supranational legal status produced by a Union 
founded on the principle of conferral21 – is not yet unquestionably endowed with fun-
damental rights.22 While numerous rights are obviously there – and this Special Section 
scrutinises an array of those in detail too, from free movement and family reunification 
to social assistance, citizens’ initiative and fundamental rights in times of economic cri-
sis, to freedom to move investments around the Union and voting rights – the depend-
ence of any EU citizenship rights claims on the division of competences between the EU 
and the Member States unquestionably demonstrates the far-reaching limits of EU citi-
zenship.23 This is because the division of competences between the EU and the Member 
States generally follows what one can term as a cross-border or internal market logic.24 
Consequently, the actual usefulness of supranational citizenship in taming the negative 
externalities of the internal market, as well as in establishing a firm ethical and moral 
grounding and justification for EU citizenship outside the frame of the internal market 
 
17 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 1997, joined cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen v. Uecker and Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, para. 23. 
18 Although Paul Craig does not use it as an example in his notable account: P. CRAIG, The ECJ and Ul-
tra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis, in Common Market Law Review, 2011, p. 395 et seq. 
19 D. KOCHENOV, R. PLENDER, EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The 
Discovery of the Treaty Text, in European Law Review, 2012, p. 369 et seq. 
20 See, for a very detailed account, D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit. 
21 This being said, it is impossible to claim that this derivative status does not impact, in the most di-
rect way, the rules of conferral and withdrawal of the nationalities of the Member States, from which it is 
derived: D. KOCHENOV, Member State Nationalities and the Internal Market, in N. NIC SHUIBHNE, L.W. 
GORMLEY (eds), From Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2012, p. 241 et seq. 
22 E. SHARPSTON, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights – Pandora’s Box or a Natural Step Towards Ma-
turity?, in P. CARDONNEL, A. ROSAS, N. WAHL (eds), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in Hon-
our of Pernilla Lindh, Oxford: Hart, 2012, p. 245 et seq. Cf. S. IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison?, in European Law 
Journal, 2014, p. 464 et seq.; D. KOCHENOV, R. PLENDER, EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipi-
ent Substance?, cit.; P. CARO DE SOUSA, Quest for the Holy Grail – Is a Unified Approach to the Market Free-
doms and European Citizenship Justified?, in European Law Journal, 2014, p. 499 et seq. 
23 M. VAN DEN BRINK, EU Citizenship and (Fundamental) Rights: Empirical, Normative, and Conceptual 
Problems, in European Law Journal, 2018, p. 1 et seq. 
24 See, most importantly, A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International, 2009. 
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has been, although theoretically possible,25 truly feeble if not non-existent in practice.26 
The result has been the weakening of the EU’s justice claims,27 and the punishment and 
undermining of the life-chances of those citizens who fail to qualify as “good enough” 
when scrutinised through the internal market lens.28 One of the core features of the EU 
as it stands consists, accordingly, in ignoring the pain of such unworthy citizens and fail-
ing to help those in need, explaining away their plight, as Charlotte O’Brien among oth-
ers has splendidly demonstrated.29 As far as EU law is concerned, those who are not 
“good enough” for its scope do not exist, falling between the cracks in the dogmas of 
the internal market rationality. 
It is while burnishing the label on this citizenship which fosters its internal market 
logic, ignoring the vulnerable instead of defending citizenship bearers from market ex-
ternalities, that the oxymoronic “market citizenship” was born.30 With respect to those 
proclaiming it – and they are no doubt correct in their meticulous engagement with the 
case law31 – “market citizenship” is without doubt a misnomer: it simply cannot be taken 
seriously unless deployed, as the majority of the literature has done, purely descriptive-
ly. The reason for this is that to do more requires an inevitable reversal of all the key 
principles informing the understanding of citizenship and the reasons for the articula-
tion of the term in the first place, which occurs when the full enjoyment of this citizen-
ship’s rights and status is made the prize for one’s employability and history of travel 
around the Union, instead emerging from any idea of equality before the law and pro-
tecting the vulnerable.32 
 
25 E.g. D. KOCHENOV, The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification, in Euro-
pean Law Journal, 2013, p. 502 et seq. 
26 C. O’BRIEN, Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2016, p. 937 et seq.; G. PEEBLES, “A Very Eden of the Innate Rights of Man”? A 
Marxist Look at the European Union Treaties and Case Law, in Law and Social Inquiry, 1997, p. 581 et seq. 
27 G. DE BÚRCA, Conclusion, in D. KOCHENOV, G. DE BÚRCA, A. WILLIAMS (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit?, Ox-
ford, Portland: Hart, 2015, p. 459 et seq. 
28 That a citizenship would punish those who do not qualify as “good citizens” in the eyes of the authori-
ty in charge is one of the core functions of the legal status. On this count the EU is not at all atypical, com-
pared with any other public authority in the world, which selects “citizens” among the available bodies, 
whatever criteria are employed: D. KOCHENOV, Citizenship, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2019 (forthcoming). 
29 C. O’BRIEN, Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, Ox-
ford, Portland: Hart, 2017. 
30 N. NIC SHUIBHNE, The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship, in Common Market Law Review, 2010, p. 
1597 et seq.; C. O’BRIEN, Civis Capitalist Sum, cit. 
31 N. NIC SHUIBHNE, Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2015, p. 889 et seq.; N. NIC SHUIBHNE, Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal 
Citizenship, cit., p. 147 et seq.; M. VAN DEN BRINK, EU Citizenship and (Fundamental) Rights, cit. 
32 See, for a very detailed treatment, D. KOCHENOV, On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as the Federal 
Denominator, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 3. 
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All the talk of democracy and rights33 within the unchangeable market citizenship 
paradigm34 could thus be nothing but a renewed entrenchment and glorification of the 
“wholly internal situation” and “reverse discrimination” thinking accompanied by the pre-
sumption that those who opt to remain outwith the scope of EU law35 – by staying at 
home for instance36 – deserve zero protection and respect within the legal context of the 
Union. This is an old and deeply troubling story ably characterised by Joseph Weiler as the 
loss by the Union of a mantle of ideals – and not much has changed in all the years since 
this characterisation appeared in print.37 By connecting human worth and dignity, any 
claim to rights, to employability and the mantras of a citizen’s usefulness in the context of 
the Internal Market, “market citizenship” is the epitome of the ideological space where a 
human being is openly – not tacitly – commodified, and those evading commodification or 
perceived as not useful enough are not deemed worthy of the quasi-citizenship at stake.38 
They are not “market citizens” and any other citizenship is apparently not on offer. 
The result of this is troubling. When made dependent on the division of compe-
tences in the scope of the rights it protects, EU citizenship is turned into a neo-
mediaeval “citizenship of personal circumstances”:39 a judge first needs to see your full 
curriculum vitae with all your jobs, travel history,40 the nationality of your current and 
former spouses,41 partners and children,42 and bank accounts,43 to see whether you – a 
 
33 K. LENAERTS, J.A. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, Epilogue on EU Citizenship: Hopes and Fears, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), 
EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 751 et seq.; S. PLATON, The Right to Participate in the European Elec-
tions and the Vertical Division of Competences in the European Union, in European Papers, Vol. 3, 2018, 
no. 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 1245 et seq. 
34 G. DAVIES, Social Legitimacy and Purposive Power: The End, the Means and the Consent of the Peo-
ple, in D. KOCHENOV, G. DE BÚRCA, A. WILLIAMS (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit?, cit., p. 259 et seq.; A. SOMEK, 
Europe: Political, Not Cosmopolitan, in European Law Journal, 2014, p. 142 et seq.  
35 E.g. H. KROEZE, Distinguishing Between Use and Abuse of EU Free Movement Law: Evaluating Use 
of the “Europe-route” for Family Reunification to Overcome Reverse Discrimination in European Papers, 
Vol. 3, 2018, no. 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 1209 et seq. 
36 S. IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ, A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right Not to Move in a Union Based on Free 
Movement, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 371 et seq.; G. DAVIES, A Right to 
Stay at Home: A Basis for Expanding European Family Rights, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, cit., p. 468. 
37 J.H.H. WEILER, Bread and Circus: The State of the European Union, in Columbia Journal of European 
Law, 1998, p. 231. 
38 G. PEEBLES, “A Very Eden of the Innate Rights of Man”?, cit.; P. CARO DE SOUSA, Quest for the Holy 
Grail, cit.; C. O’BRIEN, Civis Capitalist Sum, cit.; D. KOCHENOV, On Tiles and Pillars, cit., pp. 3-82. 
39 D. KOCHENOV, The Citizenship of Personal Circumstances in Europe, in D. THYM (ed.), Questioning EU 
Citizenship, Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2018, p. 37 et seq. 
40 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C-434/09, McCarthy; N. NIC SHUIBHNE, (Some of) the 
Kids Are All Right: Comment on McCarthy and Dereci, in Common Market Law Review, 2012, p. 349 et seq.  
41 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2005, case C-403/03, Schempp; E. SPAVENTA, Seeing the Wood 
Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects, in Common Market 
Law Review, 2008, p. 21, note 34. 
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citizen – “deserve” any EU citizenship rights. This story would not be complete without 
mentioning that, unlike in the earlier case law, dual nationality could be interpreted 
against you, as David de Groot’s ground-breaking research has shown.44 Neither disabil-
ity nor pregnancy will help characterise you as a “good” EU citizen either.45 A truly minor 
crime will disqualify you from supranational rights, dignity and respect.46 Not even be-
ing deemed a worker is enough anymore:47 EU law will eagerly side with the Member 
States oppressing their ethnic and linguistic, and presumably other minorities, as long 
as frowning upon these groups is part of their “constitutional identity”, thus capable of 
creating a de facto wholly internal situation, depriving “market citizens” otherwise not 
unworthy per se of rights under EU law.48 The result is a self-proclaimed constitutional 
system without a free and self-determining constitutional subject endowed with 
rights:49 a neo-mediaeval construct where liberty and entitlements are strictly appor-
tioned based on esoteric considerations rooted in personal histories, wealth, potential 
and actual employability, and travel and the willingness to do so: a triumph of contin-
 
42 Coman and Others, cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16, Lounes. 
Very much depends on whether one of the spouses is an EU citizen and whether this citizenship counts: 
also S. TITSHAW, Same-Sex Spouses Lost in Translation? How to Interpret ‘Spouse’ in the EU Family Migra-
tion Directives, in Boston University International Law Journal, 2016, p. 58. 
43 Court of Justice: judgment of 10 October 2013, case C-86/12, Alokpa and Moudoulou; judgment of 
19 October 2004, case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen. Cf. E. SPAVENTA, Earned Citizenship – Understanding Union 
Citizenship through Its Scope, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 204 et seq.; C. 
O’BRIEN, Civis Capitalist Sum, cit. 
44 D.A.J.G. DE GROOT, Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens, in European Papers, Vol. 3, 2018, no. 3, 
www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 1075 et seq. 
45 C. O’BRIEN, Union Citizenship and Disability: Restricted Access to Equality Rights and the Attitudinal 
Model of Disability, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 509 et seq.; C. O’BRIEN, Civis 
Capitalist Sum, cit.  
46 U. BELAVUSAU, D. KOCHENOV, Kirchberg Dispensing the Punishment: Inflicting ‘Civil Death’ on Prison-
ers in Onuekwere (C-378/12) and M.G. (C-400/12), in European Law Review, 2016, p. 557 et seq.; C. 
O’BRIEN, Real Links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: The Relationship between the ECJ’s “Real Link” Case 
Law and National Solidarity, in European Law Review, 2008, p. 643 et seq. 
47 This development was predicted by Síofra O’Leary long ago: S. O’LEARY, Developing an Ever Closer 
Union between the Peoples of Europe?: A Reappraisal of the Case-Law of the Court of Justice on the Free 
Movement of Persons and EU Citizenship, in Edinburgh Mitchell Working Papers, no. 6, 2008, pp.14-24. 
See, for a majestic treatment, A. TRYFONIDOU, Impact of Union Citizenship on the EU’s Market Freedoms, 
Oxford, London: Hart, 2016. 
48 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 2011, case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn. The case is 
analysed in this vein in D. KOCHENOV, When Equality Directives are Not Enough: Taking an Issue with the 
Missing Minority Rights Policy in the EU, in U. BELAVUSAU, K. HENRARD (eds), EU Anti-Discrimination Law be-
yond Gender, Oxford, London: Hart, 2018, p. 119 et seq. Cf. A. ŁAZOWSKI E. DAGILYTĖ, P. STASINOPOULOS, The 
Importance of Being Earnest: Spelling of Names, EU Citizenship and Fundamental Rights, in Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 2015, p. 1 et seq.  
49 Cf. L. AZOULAI, S. BARBOU DES PLACES, E. PATAUT (eds), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, 
Identities, Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2016. 
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gent and morally vacant acts necessary to be performed to enter the Union’s field of 
vision and thereby become endowed with personality in its law, which is the law which 
purports to have claimed you as its citizen, on top of your own national legal order.50 
The main outcome of such an approach to the individual is as atypical as it is trou-
bling: before a person’s CV and bank accounts have been investigated, the most funda-
mental, essential legal principles of Western constitutionalism will not apply. This especial-
ly concerns equality before the law, which does not kick in if you are too poor, like Miss 
Dano; too pregnant, like Jessy Saint Pris;51 or too Polish for the Lithuanian State, like 
Małgorzata Runiewicz. We are thus confronted by the lack of equality before the law as 
the main starting principle for dealing with EU citizens in a context where the EU produces 
and constantly re-enacts a neo-mediæval presumption of difference the goodness of 
which is presumed and does not per se require justification.52 Why this is the case has 
been explained to the citizens a thousand times: Niamh Nic Shuibhne might indeed be 
right that this is the Court willing “to accept the limitations coded into the current federal 
bargain”.53 Yet it is not the protection of a perfect Constitution from human rights con-
cerns – which the Court famously did, inter alia, in Opinion 2/1354 – but taking such con-
cerns seriously, which ensures that legal systems are both respected and effective. Hon-
ouring the bargain, when viewed in this light, could obviously be a big problem.55 
I.2. Armed with respect for the federal bargain which requires blind faith in and 
strict adherence to a context-sensitive neo-mediævalism, EU citizenship sends two sig-
nals. Firstly, it significantly empowers the willing Member State nationals, “good 
enough” in the eyes of the supranational authorities, to fall within the scope of EU law. 
Volumes have been written about the freedom of movement of persons and the right is 
significant. The very horizon of opportunities of all Member State nationals is broad-
ened by the intercitizenship logic of the supranational status, working as a package of 
 
50 D. KOCHENOV, On Tiles and Pillars, cit., p. 3 et seq. 
51 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 June 2014, case C-507/12, Saint Prix; S. CURRIE, Pregnancy-Related 
Employment Breaks, the Gender Dynamics of Free Movement Law and Curtailed Citizenship: Jessy Saint 
Prix, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, p. 543 et seq.  
52 D. KOCHENOV, Neo-Mediaeval Permutations of Personhood in the European Union, in L. AZOULAI, S. 
BARBOU DES PLACES, E. PATAUT (eds), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities, cit., p. 133 
et seq. 
53 N. NIC SHUIBHNE, Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship, cit., p. 176. 
54 Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para. 170. P. EECKHOUT, Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?, in Fordham International Law Jour-
nal, 2015, p. 955 et seq.; D. KOCHENOV, EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy 
Worth It?, in Yearbook of European Law, 2015, p. 94 et seq. 
55 J. BALKIN, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, in Fordham Law Review, 1997, p. 
1703 et seq. 
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dozens of national legal statuses fused into one.56 Secondly, being silent on the scope 
of the law, EU citizenship is constantly presented to us as relatively weak, all the nu-
merous successes reported notwithstanding. Crucially, it is respectful even when the 
issues to hand unquestionably fall within the scope of EU law: if a Member States wants 
to ignore EU law to grant fewer rights to women – it can.57 If a Member State wishes to 
continue abusing its own ethnic minorities by denying them a right to a name – it can.58 
Both the rights of individuals and the sovereignty of the Member States thus stand pro-
tected – to a point.59 The flexibility of this arrangement seems to be key, however, 
which seems to be fundamental to the proverbial “federal bargain”. Moreover, if a 
Member State you are associated with leaves the EU, your supranational “new” citizen-
ship is thereby extinguished: it is not that personal after all.60  
II. Although the literature on EU citizenship has been booming in recent years, the abso-
lute majority of analyses have been confined to reactions to the ever-growing and byz-
antine case law and trying to make sense of the Court’s hints in various directions.61 
This is no doubt the core of legal research and some of the contributions developing 
scholarship in this direction have been spectacularly illuminating.62 The majority of the 
contributions to this Special Section fit equally well within this established tradition. But 
what if we tease the “true” lawyers a little and entertain scrutiny of the very context of 
EU law, using its citizenship as a pretext, in the vein of Pedro Caro de Sousa, Agustín Jo-
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sé Menéndez, Charlotte O’Brien and Alexander Somek?63 Questioning the established 
story can be a useful way to see the well-known case law, as well as all the twists and 
turns of the European citizenship story, in quite a different light. 
It can be argued that EU citizenship works against the established understandings 
of a) statehood, b) citizenship, c) democracy and d) equality, situating these in the con-
text of cosmopolitan constitutionalism.64 The current dynamics illustrate the well-noted 
Joppkean global weakening of citizenship65 and the rise of a new way of organising po-
litical communities.66 European citizenship exemplifies key future global trends in citi-
zenship and the development of constitutionalism, even if as already mentioned, with a 
necessary, surprising neo-mediaeval twist.67 
II.1. EU citizenship rights are of great importance, enlarging citizens’ horizons of op-
portunities by a factor of twenty-eight:68 work, residence, family reunification and non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality where EU law is applicable – all have become 
claims to be turned against the government of any participating State, whether an EU 
member or not. Moreover, the direct effect of EU law, including its citizenship rights 
provisions, ensures that national law cannot prevail in the face of EU citizens’ suprana-
tional entitlements.69 States stand “humiliated”,70 obviously enjoying no power – legally 
at least – to close their territories and their nations to others, however friendly these 
are proclaimed to be. This touches the core of statehood, if not nationhood: no Mem-
ber State can decide (some exceptions notwithstanding)71 who among the EU’s citizens 
may enter its territory, reside and work there. Going further, a similar regime applies to 
a huge number of foreigners too, be they EEA nationals, third country national family 
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members of EU citizens or other privileged categories.72 Furthermore, States have lost 
the ability to favour “their own” – the first key feature of any citizenship, distinguishing 
between “us” and “them” – in a growing array of situations: the core outcome of the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality in within the scope of applica-
tion of EU law.73 EU citizens are now virtually always “us”, striking at the heart of nation-
al citizenships. Being unable to empower “their own” affects the nature of European 
States. Rather than picking citizens through the framing of migration and naturalisation 
legislation, in the EU the States are picked by citizens directly empowered by EU law. 
The essential legal characteristics of European States and their nationalities are thereby 
seriously altered. The new reality has not yet been fully internalised by the legal-political 
systems of the Member States. 
II.2. The implications for the nature of democracy are equally significant. In terms of 
procedure, EU citizens participate in EU-level and municipal-level elections in their State 
of residence,74 as well as being able to register citizens’ initiatives, provided what these 
propose is within the scope of EU law.75 Even without covering national elections, the 
EU and its citizenship is a vehicle of democratic inclusion. Simultaneously, however, EU 
citizenship can shield its bearers from the application of legitimate democratic out-
comes to them, once a connection with EU law is found. Having its final say, the Court of 
Justice then tests the reasonableness and proportionality of any national measure. This 
potentially covers any national rule objected to by an EU citizen, including rules on na-
tionality itself.76 Democracy’s function is thus changed significantly, placing absolute 
emphasis on contestation.77 This produces new users of democracy: cosmopolitans 
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fighting “unreasonable” regulation.78 While the trend is not new,79 the EU context rein-
forces it. Having used EU law to choose a State, EU citizens both participate in demo-
cratic decision-making and enjoy protection from its legitimate outcomes. This is valid 
at all levels of the law, including legislation, constitutional-level rules and the duties of 
State-level citizenship. That said, citizens cannot do much supranationally, given that 
the design of the Union prevents the essential principles of the internal market from 
being subjected to democratic contestation, or any other form for that matter.80 In a 
curious ideological twist, the internal market as it stands is presented to the Europeans 
as rational, technocratic and apolitical, foreclosing any democratic dialogue about Eu-
rope’s future development.81 
II.3. Akin to sorting “us” from “them”, equality among the holders of the status is a 
core feature of citizenship. Its practical realisation depends on how clearly the scopes of 
EU and national law are delineated: both promise equality. Since, as we have seen, EU 
citizenship cannot bring citizens automatically within the material scope of EU law, addi-
tional factors are determinant. The law is malleable: the nationality of your former 
wife,82 being born across a border83 or the vague likelihood of changing States in the 
future84 can suffice to bring EU-level equality into play, covering a flexible group of EU 
citizens; though not all. While EU and national citizenships extend equally to the same 
people, the application of EU equality – not dependent only on status – is an either/or 
question which disables national equality claims, as the question is not answered by 
analysing the objective situation of the person concerned. The Court’s attempts to 
frame EU law’s scope through the severity of the actual or potential violation of the es-
sence of EU-level rights85 met strong resistance, ruining clarity. When France promises 
equality to all Frenchmen it cannot possibly deliver, since two French neighbours living 
largely similar lives can be subject to two different legal systems for reasons bearing no 
relation to their lives or legal status. The promises of national and EU-level equality are 
fictitious: indeed, it is the differentiation in the face of the law, rather than equality be-
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fore the law, which emerges as the main supranational – and thus national-level – legal 
principle, as far as EU citizenship is concerned. 
II.4. As a result of the blurred and contested essence of EU citizenship, the nature of 
the state, democracy and national citizenship in the EU are profoundly transformed. By 
its very existence, the EU and its citizenship promote one particular type of constitu-
tionalism86 to which the Member States are bound to adhere, which implies an empha-
sis on proportionality and justification,87 and a toning down of representative democra-
cy and equality claims. Due to the penetrating nature of EU law, the relationship be-
tween the levels of the law in this model is far more complex than in the majority of 
“straightforward” federations:88 the EU is much more malleable and haphazard.89 Two 
key features of national citizenship do not hold true here: in a Union where EU law en-
joys supremacy and direct effect and the scope of this law is necessarily blurred, citi-
zenship firstly does not bring about equal treatment. Secondly, national citizenship 
does not provide better treatment than other EU citizens within the scope of application 
of EU law. EU law thus brings about a very significant alteration to the very legal es-
sence of the Member States’ nationalities. Crucially, the humiliation of the state and un-
dermining of the key features of citizenship is not accompanied by a solid doctrinal or 
practical alternative: we are not shown a new way. Instead, we are constantly treated to 
the dogmatic mantra of the perceived benefits of the “apolitical” internal market. As a 
result, morally and ethically vacant reasons rooted in the internal market – such as the 
programmed-in belief that those who chose to move about in space are entitled to 
more constitutional protections and are more “valuable” as EU citizens – can set aside 
fundamental human rights concerns and key principles of the national constitutional 
law of the Member States. Setting aside the norms of a particular legal order is not a 
problem per se, of course. It becomes a problem, however, when the reasons under-
pinning this are not sufficiently clear – if not arcane – and are entirely removed from the 
realm of democratic testing. 
III. The legal context of the EU, amplifying and reinforcing the global trends in citizen-
ship, equality and democracy, also brings with it grave challenges, and as a path-
dependent process faces virtually no serious challenge. Critical analyses of it are equally 
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limited and surprisingly new.90 Hungary and Poland, with their crises of the rule of 
law,91 or the United Kingdom, with its anti-immigration populism,92 oppose the EU for 
entirely different reasons. However, the ongoing process of reinvention both of citizen-
ship and the state in the EU has only just begun. Exposing it with clarity and scrutinising 
its implications for the development of the constitutional systems around the world is a 
starting point for coping with a reality which is here to stay. The sterile and cartoonish 
official story retold in EU textbooks simply does not hold, and States which fail to take 
note are in danger of getting a rude awakening in the near future, be it through absurd 
populist victories or by finding themselves attempting to implement Brexit-like claims. 
An alternative narrative of EU citizenship, to contribute to a sound dynamic understand-
ing of the evolution of statehood and citizenship in Europe and beyond is sorely needed 
at the moment. EU citizenship, focused on fundamental rights, equality and a critical 
rethinking of the core grounds behind the division of competences between the EU and 
the Member States, could provide such a much-needed narrative and a starting point, 
offering a sounder and less awkwardly “depoliticised” paradigm of European integration 
than the pure internal market. One can coexist with the other, but the realisation that 
the essential starting points of the internal market and of EU citizenship are incompati-
ble should necessarily be the starting point of such a journey.93 
This is the context that the contributions to this Special Section should be consid-
ered within. All the Articles which follow are rooted in the conference dedicated to the 
publication of EU Citizenship and Federalism, which dissected the role EU citizenship 
rights could play as potential triggers of jurisdiction, to save this supranational personal 
legal status from the internal market contamination currently opposing, as we have 
seen, citizenship’s necessary rationale and purpose. The conference was held at the 
Court of Justice and the University of Luxembourg in November 2017, and was made 
possible with the generous help from the Amicale des référendaires, William Valasidis 
of the Court of Justice and Eleftheria Neframi of the University of Luxembourg. The core 
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question this Special Section engages with is simple: how far is EU citizenship deserving 
of its name and what kind of rights could Europeans legitimately see as unquestionably 
associated with it – as opposed to with a proxy of the internal market, that is. Let us cast 
another glance at EU citizenship’s lived reality and systemic implications and join these 
nine wonderful authors – both upcoming and already famous – in attempting to move 
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